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Abstract. The purpose of this report is to formulate a position on trust and trust-
related issues in GOLD. GOLD (Grid-based Information Models to Support the 
Rapid Innovation of New High Value-Added Chemicals) is concerned with the 
dynamic formation and management of virtual organisations in order to exploit 
market opportunities. The project aims to deliver the enabling technology to support 
the creation, operation and successful termination of such virtual organisations. A set 
of middleware technologies are designed and being implemented to address issues 
such as trust, security, contract management and monitoring, information 
management, etc. for virtual collaboration between companies.  Trust is an important 
and essential attribute in the formation and operation of VO’s composed on 
organisational entities. In this report we explore how trust can emerge to support 
such a complex, dynamic network through a dependable architectural framework. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this document is to explain a number of architectural decisions that 
have been made to support the non-functional property of trust in Gold. Part of the 
overall goal of the GOLD project is to provide a new way of carrying out chemical 
development, which partly requires re-thinking, re-evaluating and therefore re-
structuring the way companies have been carrying out such a process. Typically in 
systems development, both evolution and radical change are met (at best) with 
scepticism. In our case this (as the Soft Systems Methodology [27] models show in 
appendix 1) can manifest itself as a lack of trust in the proposed new way of doing 
business (i.e. distrust). We explored this issue in more detail in a previous document 
[22]. Our job in this document is two fold, as we are required to address and remove 
the property of distrust and gradually replace it with that of trust. The process raises a 
number of architectural issues and requires a number of architectural decisions, all of 
which are presented in the following sections. The document describes our attempt at 
utilising a structured approach to analysing all the issues around this fundamental 
property. 
 
It is very difficult to find a unified view of trust across different disciplines. It is 
usually defined in computer science terms, social terms, economic or financial terms. 
Yet there is a pattern of elements that keeps emerging (implicitly or explicitly) in 
various definitions, depending on the domain where the definition stems from. 
Confidence in a party’s ability, willingness to rely on them and the notion of risk, are 
all terms embedded in most definitions of trust. Confidence implies some degree of 
understanding of one’s capabilities, i.e. what the party that one is relying upon is 
capable of doing. Willingness to rely on someone implies the existence of some 
motive, which in some cases may be the value they can add. Risk implies some sort of 
understanding of the cost of a possible failure as well as the probability factor 
associated with each failure mode. Further notions such as trust motives (added value) 
are central to achieving, determining and implementing trust relationships. We re-visit 
these notions later in our analysis. Elements such as risk [17], reliability [5], 
confidence [2] and failure [21], are central in trust related definitions. Coincidently all 
these coincide with the general concerns related to managing business change and 
process evolution. [23] 
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GOLD proposes a new way of carrying out chemical development, based on the 
formation of a new business paradigm; that of a virtual organisation. Adapting or 
evolving a rigid business model, which has been tried and tested, to the way GOLD 
proposes certainly raises concerns.  
 
The report is structured as follows. We start with a brief literature review and we draw 
upon certain definitions in order to develop our own thinking. We show how the SSM 
approach helped us reveal some of the properties of trust, which -following the SSM 
paradigm- we define as separate systems. We use these SSM systems to develop 
properties which GOLD needs to support in order to enhance and promote trust. 
Furthermore we use the concepts developed with SSM to provide a mapping between 
those and their corresponding architectural components. We provide high level 
descriptions of those architectural components and discuss their need. The document 
finishes with 2 appendices one of which includes details of the SSM analysis and a 
further one on conversation theory models. 
 
1.1 Overview 
Since this section is mostly about a trust overview and our attempt to try to come to 
terms with the notion, we would like to acknowledge some definitions which have 
been instrumental in our thinking. Some of the more generic views are ones such as 
Elofson’s who describes trust as “the reliance upon the characteristics of an object, or 
the occurrence of an event, or the behaviour of a person in order to achieve a desired 
but uncertain objective in a risky situation.” [5]. Luhmann gives a similar definition of 
trust: “Trust is a reliance in turbulent conditions on some number of certainties and on 
other individuals’ actions, that affect one’s own welfare, that despite conditions 
largely unknown can be counted on to act in a predictable and presumably benevolent 
fashion” [11]. Trust can also be defined as “the degree of confidence that you feel 
when you think about a relationship” [13] as cited in [5]. Or as “an interpersonal or 
inter-organizational state that reflects the extent to which the parties can predict one 
another’s behavior, can depend on one another when it counts; and have faith that the 
other will continue to act in a responsive manner despite an uncertain future.” [16]. 
All the above definitions characterize the state of trust, but they do not explain how 
this state can be reached. They address however issues such as reliance, risk and 
confidence that we discussed earlier. In the following paragraph we draw upon one 
particular definition; that of Luhman. 
 
1.2 Trust and Dependability 
In computer science in particular, trust and trustworthiness are studied under the 
broad umbrella of dependability.  Dependability is defined as a system’s property, 
such that reliance can justifiably be placed on the service that it delivers [21]. From 
the definition we can see that it is a property of subjective value, depending highly on 
the domain for which it is perceived. By enhancing the dependability features of the 
system the confidence in its usage increases. Therefore it is beneficial to study and 
address dependability as a system property very early on in the design process.  
 
Luhman’s definition of trust is interesting (and has been influential throughout this 
document) as trust is related to the methodical attempt of reducing the perceived 
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complexity of goal planning (and to an extent heuristic effort), by assuming beneficial 
actions of independent actors. Luhmann’s view on trust stems from the perception of 
the future as a set of infinite paths some of which, may lead to desired outcomes (i.e. 
reaching a goal). Luhmann elaborates on his view of trust by discussing it in terms of 
the notion of multiplicity of paths. Paths in the normative sense refer to the different 
directions one can be led as a consequence of an action. Some paths are desirable 
while others are not. Therefore given the above premises, trust becomes the risk one 
willingly accepts when one relies upon someone else to take an action that will lead 
into a desired path. Deviation from the desired path would constitute failure. There 
are some obvious parallels between Luhmann’s views on trust and system theory 
views of computer dependability. Trust becomes the process by which a system 
ensures that certain paths (i.e. states) will not be reached. So according to his 
definition assurances given against these states by the party one is relying upon 
provide the means for establishing trust. It links quite well with our system view of 
states. Actions on a system may lead to several states, some of which may be 
erroneous while other may be desired. Trust is therefore an expectation that the 
trustor’s actions will not lead to an erroneous state. 
 
Within a VO, for example, a company may require guarantees that its documents will 
not be misused, accessed without their permission, or stolen. All of these bear 
implications which in turn raise concerns and inhibit the adaptation of the new 
process (i.e. doing things the GOLD way). The way to address this situation is by 
understanding those concerns, developing processes tolerant to the failures raised by 
those concerns and demonstrating the solutions system processes offer to those 
concerns. A solution for example to the concern regarding the misuse of documents 
can be provided by a combination of public key cryptography (which we will discuss 
later) and access control mechanisms. Implementation of such technologies will allow 
GOLD to offer guarantees against such concerns. The question that we can raise is 
how can we limit, control and tolerate the vastness of the state space. 
 
2 Trust evaluation 
In order to reach the point of being willing to trust (i.e. establish a relationship) it is 
necessary to evaluate the risk associated with such reliance. There three main 
instruments by which trust is evaluated: information, history and context. Information 
is almost self explanatory. The more information you have about one party the more 
likely it is to make an informed decision regarding how much risk you can place in 
their actions. Passport control or visa applications are the most obvious examples. 
History is another type of evaluation. The amount of information that was implied in 
the first type of evaluation may not be present. However a history of successful 
collaborations may be enough to evaluate the trustworthiness of one party, i.e. the risk 
one is willing to take. Finally both of the above elements may be absent but trust can 
still emerge when parties share the same context, which can take the form of a social 
context, a legal context, being bound by the same regulations etc.   
 
2.1 Trust Evaluation: Information  
The first and foremost method of dealing with the lack of trust is by acquiring 
information. Information however, although a strong medium for achieving trust 
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relationships, has to be evaluated against legal issues such as privacy and data 
protection. Information based trust relationships are evaluated on one to one basis. If 
for example company A knows a great deal about company B and therefore trusts B, 
it does not necessarily imply that company A trusts the GOLD system (within which 
B is part of) as a whole. Note here that within GOLD trust relationships are not 
transitive. If A trusts B and B trusts C then this does not necessarily imply that A also 
trusts C. Trust is the property of the context within which A, B, and C operate. To put 
it simply it is the context they trust not each other. The implication this has on GOLD 
is that identities of all participants would need to be revealed as well as all activities 
and actions performed by the participants as part of the VO. Trust in this scenario 
emerges as a property between the trustees that engage in a symmetric one to one 
collaboration. These type of trust relations are not transferable in the sense that if a 
party trusts part of the VO, this does not imply that it will trust the whole VO. 
Information based trust relationships, have to be established in a one-to-one fashion. 
2.2 Trust Evaluation: Experience 
Trust is not a static state, but instead a dynamic one, as it can change over time 
because it is based on observed events in the real world [14]. Lewis and Weigert state 
the same when they state that trust is formed by  “observations that indicate that 
members of a system act according to and are secure in the expected futures 
constituted by the presence of each other for their symbolic representations.” [9]. 
Elofson identifies the same origins of trust in “Trust is the outcome of observations 
leading to the belief that the actions of another may be relied upon” [5]. Events that 
are observed in the real world can only be interpreted within the context in which they 
take place. This context defines whether an event helps in achieving ones goals or not 
and also helps understanding the situation in which the other was placed (e.g., 
sometimes you cannot really blame someone for not helping you.).  
 
Formal trust modelling [8] which is consistently used in financial domains, is used to 
identify trust and model them as a series of risk-affecting events. In such frameworks 
some of the events in the world are considered trust-influencing experiences. Such 
events can have an either positive or negative effect. They may increase your trust in 
something or someone, or decrease it. According to this framework the trust that is 
acquired by an actor depends on two variables, the initial trust and the trust dynamics. 
The model for trust dynamics specifies how an agent adjusts its trust in someone or 
something based on experiences. One conclusion we made based on this research is 
that experience-based trust evaluation creates the need for observation and monitoring 
which needs to be adapted within GOLD as a separate, complete system. 
2.3 Trust Evaluation: Context  
Context can also be important in establishing a trust relationship. Being part of the 
same group, team or seeking the same goal enables the development of a trust. It is 
worth noting here that context related trust is not transferable in the sense that a trust 
relationship formed as part of a context, does not imply that the trust value for that 
particular relationship will stand outside this context. In GOLD the above observation 
has pros and cons. Since the trust value of a relationship within a specific context (i.e. 
a specific VO project) is not transferable, the identities of participants in these 
relationships can be compromised (hidden completely or partly), enabling GOLD to 
operate on a partly anonymous role based structure. Trust emerges as a property 
between the participant and the context i.e. the participant trusts the context. This is 
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contrary to information based trust where relationships are evaluated on a one to one 
basis, and hence identities have to be provided. Building a context-based trust model 
for GOLD would allow us to trade part of the identity of the actual participants (role 
based anonymity), allowing GOLD to maintain most of the control of the VO 
operations, while at the same time distribute control of the resources (i.e. operation on 
resources) to the VO participants. GOLD would then provide guarantees to 
participants regarding usage of resources. 
3 Trust and Conversations 
The first analysis required to understand the trust property is to understand and 
characterize the relationship between GOLD parties. The following paragraph is 
based on conversation theory [2][3]. Appendix 2 provides some schematics for this 
analysis. Conversation theory is a framework for classifying relationships. 
Relationships are evaluated against the values of four attributes. These are 
significance, mutuality, control and capability. Significance shows how the benefits of 
the relationships are distributed. If for example a relationship between two parties is 
of symmetric significance then we can conclude that both parties share the same 
benefit. If however the significance is asymmetric then one of the parties benefits 
more. Mutuality shows how responsible each party is for the benefits of the other. A 
relationship with symmetric mutuality implies co-operation, whereas asymmetric 
mutuality would imply competition. The third attribute, that is control, shows which 
of the parties has control over the creation or the break up of the relationship. 
Capability -the fourth attribute- shows whether the two parties share resources during 
their relationship. We can use this approach to characterize the relationships in our 
model. We identified 3 types of relationships with various values of significance and 
mutuality. The fact that GOLD deals with a mixture of symmetric and asymmetric 
values implies some form of incompatibility that would hinder the potential for 
development of trust between certain parties. Given our premise that trust is a 
property found mainly in symmetric relationships in terms of significance and 
mutuality [4], it makes sense to mask the asymmetric relationships in GOLD under 
one single type; one of which is GOLD itself. Symmetric relationships are 
characterised by uniform distribution of value and responsibility. In the domain of 
GOLD, given our discussion, we need to establish these symmetric relationships in a 
rapidly-changing, dynamic environment where the participants may not have any 
prior knowledge of each other. Companies that already know each other are more 
likely to trust the GOLD way of development chemicals, than companies that do not 
trust each other and also do not trust GOLD. In terms of architecture it makes sense to 
mask the second set of relationships behind a generic trust relationship, between 
GOLD and its individual participants. The architecture would therefore need to 
support relationship between GOLD and every individual company rather than 
between distrusting companies. Our first task was to develop a soft (i.e. subjective) 
rich picture of the system highlighting the properties we have discussed so far1. 
4 A Soft Approach to Trust 
The lack of trustworthy security services is a major obstacle to the use of electronic 
and mobile technologies in B2B as well as B2C services [1]. The GOLD system is a 
B2B type of system as it enables collaboration between business partners. In addition 
                                                 
1 Additional SSM models have been created to highlight various functional and non-functional aspects 
of the system. 
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GOLD is an information system with numerous users from a number of organizations, 
which gives rise to a certain degree of diversity regarding the goals of the system as 
they are perceived by the various users. Adaptation of the GOLD ‘way of thinking’ 
for implementing chemical development raises concerns with regards to all the issues 
we raised earlier. As a new and novel way of doing business it requires its participants 
to ‘change’ and ‘evolve’ their current business processes. Participants (i.e. companies 
and candidates for the virtual organization) raise concerns regarding the degree of risk 
associated with such as change, the amount of reliance that has to be placed in the 
system, the lack of confidence in the new way (stemming from lack of experience) 
and the consequences of failure. We can say that all these concerns come under the 
umbrella of trust.  Hence trust is an essential system property which needs to be 
acknowledged, understood, dealt with and demonstrated by the system, such that 
reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it provides [21]. We now explain this 
with the aid of figures. In SSM terms a system will allow an input to be transformed 
into an output.  This can be shown in the following diagram. 
 
 
Transformation 
 
 
 
In the case of GOLD, this can be expressed specifically as in the following. 
 
 
 
 
 
With the above, as companies have no conception that it is possible to work in the 
way that is envisaged by the GOLD project team, a number of assumptions need to be 
developed.  These will have a direct contribution to what the GOLD software and 
associated procedures will be like.  For the purposes of this report, the main concerns 
are issues regarding trust.  These will be developed further as a result of the 
interviews with chemical companies. In order for companies to feel that they want to 
work in a different way, they will need to be confident that it will not be high-risk.  
With GOLD they will need to be able to trust those who they are doing business with.  
As the VO context means that business-to-business communications will be mediated 
via the GOLD software, it is vital that companies concerns are addressed.  In other 
words, companies will need to be able to trust the GOLD software.  In order for this 
to happen, GOLD will need provide some guarantee in order to give participants the 
confidence that they will want to participate in the VO. 
 
We attempt to capture some of this views using Soft Systems Methodology which 
enables us to form part of our requirements2. In the appendix we capture all the SSM 
analysis that we carried out for the production of this document. In the following 
paragraphs we draw on the conclusions we reached. 
                                                 
2 The GOLD team is also carrying out extensive interviews with industrial partners and chemical 
developments companies to evaluate, cross-reference and amend our current set of requirements. 
The need to work in 
the ‘GOLD way’ 
GOLD software and 
associated procedures
Working the 
‘GOLD way’ 
Input (the need to 
do something) Process 
Output (that 
need met) 
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4.1 SSM Findings 
The SSM models revealed some initial concerns relating to the adaptation of the new 
system or -rather- the “GOLD way’ of carrying out chemical development. Breaking 
down these concerns we identified issues relating to control (i.e. how is the overall 
power within a VO distributed), guarantees against failures, reliability of the 
computer system and others. All of these concerns stem –as we expected- from the 
general lack of trust in the new way of carrying out these activities. The main 
objective therefore of this section is to address this concerns and following that 
provide a set of architectural components for dealing with the above issues.  
4.1.1 Control of resource 
The first major concern is that of control over one’s resources. Participation in the VO 
will almost certainly make necessary the need to share capability which –in the case 
of chemical development- may manifest itself as sharing resources. Some of these 
will inevitably hold sensitive data, exposure of which may compromise a company’s 
competitive advantage. The question that is raised here is how much control can 
GOLD (or the “GOLD way” of performing chemical development) allow the 
companies themselves to maintain without losing its added value. This is of course an 
architectural issue. Careful consideration of access control policies along with current 
developments in the area of service oriented architectures, demonstrate that security 
policies, regarding how a resource is used, can be expressed by the individual 
participants of the VO directly into a centralised GOLD access control component, in 
return for guarantees that the policies will be adhered to. Note here that although there 
may be generic policies set by GOLD to guide the overall composition, operation and 
termination of the VO, individual participants are also allowed to express how they 
want their resources (shared within the VO) to be protected.  Guarantees at this stage 
can imply both system type receipts (i.e. acknowledgments as part of a 
response/request protocol, for expressing policies) and legal clauses as part of a 
contract.  
4.1.2 Control of activity 
Participants in a VO are assigned various roles according to each particular project. 
We have discussed extensively the reasons for this in terms of architecture [17]. Roles 
are active in the sense that they perform activities, participate in transactions, send 
messages within timescales and according to pre and post conditions. Roles are 
encapsulated by tasks which are the higher conceptual constructs of the overall project 
plan. Workflow is the manifestation (i.e. execution) of a particular project plan, which 
in addition to encapsulating tasks, roles, pre and post conditions may include 
mechanisms for exception handling, fault tolerance and others. Participants need to be 
aware of the set of activities they need to implement as part of a VO project prior to 
the execution of the workflow. Tasks that roles participate in need to be broken down 
to specific activities, conditions that need to be satisfied, resources required, and 
timescales within which these have to be implemented.  
4.1.3 Audit 
The need for audit is a general requirement that encompasses all components of 
GOLD and its participants. Audit trails provide a general consensus about the details 
of a business process or a particular activity. The actual audit data (i.e. what 
constitutes audit trail data), as well as how these are stored, is an design issue. The 
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majority of activities in GOLD are performed as part of a set of pre-defined tasks, all 
relating to a particular phase in the chemical development life cycle. At the system 
level these collaborative activities are carried out using message exchanges. These 
message exchanges between participants are carried out via GOLD. Messages may be 
composed of documents, or may be references to documents or other resources in the 
VO.  
 
In section 4 we briefly introduced conversation theory and identified that the types of 
conversation within GOLD (and its participants) are asymmetric in terms of 
significance (i.e. they both equally benefit) but low mutuality (i.e. they are not 
responsible/liable for the benefit of each other). This is typically the case where there 
is lack of trust. Since responsibility is held by the individual participant, audit data 
would need to maintained by the individual companies, (i.e. the GOLD participants) 
and verified against a VO wide audit repository held by the GOLD owner or GOLD 
initiator. In architectural terms this implies the need for specific components that will 
capture audit data regarding the behaviour of each participant as well as a centralised 
component that would capture the audit data of the VO. 
 
Bearing in mind our previous discussion on trust and the ability to enable trust by 
providing individual companies with as much control as possible for their own 
resources, distributed audit trails can be used as irrefutable evidence of participation 
in certain activities (as held by the individual companies) and collaborations ( as held 
by the centralised VO).  The synthesis of those would constitute the audit trail of the 
VO 
4.1.4 Failure Guarantees 
An additional aspect of trust (this is where the notion of trust crosses to the domain of 
dependability) is that of guarantees against failures. Remember Luhman’s definition 
of trust as a willing risk taken by a party to rely on another, in the hope that it will not 
result in an unwanted state. Failure guarantees are in effect liabilities held by one 
party to cater for the possibility of bring in an unwanted state. The analogy is simple; 
if the number failure states decreases, the risk also decreases. Hence trust rises. The 
question is; is it economically viable to provide failure guarantees? 
 
As in any system one cannot cater for all possible failures. Failure assumptions based 
on some rationale (this is domain specific) allow one to define the possible failure 
types that can occur and consequently provide tolerance mechanisms against them.  In 
distributed systems, where control and ownership is also distributed [15], this is an 
increasingly difficult task. The reason is simple; participants have their own views on 
what constitutes fault, error and failure, judged from their limited viewpoint, against 
their individual objectives. These discrepancies between the viewpoints (which is 
some cases may be conflicting) give rise to what we termed organisational 
failures[16]. GOLD as a holder of the VO wide system view needs to be aware of 
what constitutes failure for each of the individual participants.  
 
Enabling the participant to express its darkest fears would enable GOLD to provide 
guarantees against some possible failures. As an example a participant may be 
concerned about the possible theft of sensitive data. Implementing a data transfer 
protocol on GOLD, based on public key encryption, enables GOLD to provide certain 
guarantees about how data is used. Although the mechanics of guarantees against 
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some failure modes may not be automated or at best may be partly automated, they 
are an important factor in enabling trust. 
4.1.5 Historical data 
Experience of collaborating with a particular set of participants within a VO can 
indeed promote trust as we discussed in section 3.2. Historic data, as we mentioned in 
3.2, are important in order for trust to emerge in a particular VO formation. 
Willingness to participate in a VO project may indeed depend upon this. The reason 
this is an architectural concern and not a simple implementation issue is the very 
notion of the term Role. Roles in GOLD are encapsulated by tasks (i.e. a conceptual 
boundary around them) that capture what needs to be done, pre and post condition and 
what each of the participants of that task should do and when. Requirements regarding 
privacy and anonymity of the participants or part of their activities have made it 
necessary to hide the actual identities of participants behind pre-defined standard 
roles. Although this may not be the case for all VO projects there is a need to be 
flexible about how real identities are handled or revealed to the entire VO. The 
countermeasure to anonymity is the centralised audit component which is maintained 
by the GOLD initiator and includes the actual mapping of real identities and roles. 
Since identities can be hidden behind pre-defined roles and some VO projects may 
indeed expose their participants as a set of roles, it becomes inevitable that historical 
data about the formation of a VO is maintained and handled by a centralised 
repository held by the GOLD initiator/owner. From an architectural point of view this 
is a decision that goes against our preference for distribution (other trust components 
are distributed) but it allows for much more flexibility regarding the recording of the 
identities of the participants. 
4.2 Position Statement 
Our position is that trust is not an implementation issue but an architectural one. Its 
primary objective is the alignment or mapping of strategic level business objectives 
onto the medium that delivers that business. This is obviously a bold step as it 
requires a re-thinking of how trust can be achieved and consequently engineered into 
the medium. In our case this medium is the virtual organization, which combines the 
notions of both structure (project planning, workflow) and infrastructure (web service 
security, contract, service level agreements, dependability and others). In many VO’s 
developing trust relationships based on either information, history or context is not 
feasible. We need to trade this aspect for the sake of dynamicity. We therefore need to 
put a great deal of emphasis in the infrastructure for the purpose of alleviating trust 
problems stemming from the lack of the elements we discussed earlier. The idea is to 
enable participants to express in the infrastructure their trust related policies and 
provide guarantees that the infrastructure will conform to those policies. This is the 
first step.  
 
Collaboration between participants in environments where there is not a direct trust 
relationship are evaluated against the potential risk of failure. This poses a number of 
challenges. Transactions within a workflow cannot be treated as simple message 
transfer procedures. They carry a certain amount of risk. Risk is a value determined 
by the cost/benefit analysis of the transaction. Assuming that the transaction has some 
sort of value, then it is in turn directly related to the risk a participant is willing to 
place in such a collaboration. Therefore it makes sense to design the system such that 
the collaboration between risk and value are managed. Ideally we would like to break 
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the transactional value of the whole collaboration down into smaller manageable 
risks. The reason is two fold: first of all collaborators do not risk a lot when they 
engage in a transaction. Secondly, developing collaboration out of small transactional 
value adding steps, enables two parties to develop a small history of collaboration 
which also gives rise to trust.  The question is how do we deconstruct the transactional 
value of a collaboration between 2 parties into several smaller, low risk transactions. 
This is where the concept of spheres of control can help us [18, 23]. We want to 
develop small transactional steps which in their entirety form a collaboration. In order 
to motivate the collaboration and guarantee some sort of added value, we need to map 
the smaller transactions into atomic actions. Atomicity implies single point of success. 
In our case all steps as part of the smaller set of transactions would need to be 
performed correctly in order for the transaction to be considered successful. Failure of 
an atomic action would constitute failure of the whole step. Success of an atomic 
action would give rise to trust and confidence on future collaborations while failure 
would constitute a small manageable damage. In addition GOLD could provide 
guarantees regarding the fairness of the transactions [26] as an overall monitoring 
system that would ensure a degree of symmetry between 2 participants. Such a 
guarantee would obviously further increase trust. In early design discussions the 
above has manifested itself as the VO project plan, which encompasses all roles 
(assigned to VO participants), and is further broken down into atomic tasks, and 
individual role activities. 
5 Technical Aspects of Trust 
5.1 Authentication, Authorization for resource handling 
In 5.1.1 we discussed the need for providing GOLD participants with mechanisms 
that would allow them to control their resources. Control in this case implies 
protection against unauthorized usage. The issue is two fold, as we need to control 
who accesses a resource, as well as the actions that can be performed on that resource. 
We need to provide mechanisms for both authentication of users as well as access 
control. Let us discuss these in turn. 
5.1.1 Authentication 
Authentication is the process by which GOLD and its participants can identity the 
details of a requestor. The implementation of such a mechanism is dependant upon the 
degree of anonymity supported within GOLD. The objectives of the authentication 
mechanism are twofold; First of all we need to make sure that only the right 
participants enter and operate within the VO. Secondly we want to allow the 
participants to move freely (within the range of the access control policies see 6.1.2) 
within the various security domains in GOLD. Similar to a VO project, participants 
and in particular their resources may also be password protected. On the other hand 
we want to avoid a situation where every participant has to login and logout from 
several security domains (or servers) in order to complete a VO defined task. So we 
are faced with the problem of providing a level of transparency (so that the VO looks 
and feels like an uniformed, integrated environment), where the participants login to 
the VO project only once. At the same time (in the non-virtual world) we need to 
provide an adequate, transparent, authentication layer that crosses the physical 
organizational boundaries. Single-sign-on or SSO is a mechanism that allows 
participants to cross over several security domains by only loging into the system 
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once, while their security details (credentials, certificates, etc) are being passed and 
authenticated between each domain transparently. SSO contributes to trust or better 
contributes to breaking trust barriers as the architecture itself requires some trust 
being established between the issuer of an assertion (credentials etc) and the 
participants. The actual decision on whether to grant access or deny it is always 
maintained by the resource owner, so the risk of performing and consequently 
conforming to the SSO architecture is small. Some of the architectural components 
required are the following. 
 
a) mapping between real identities and roles as defined within the workflow 
b) federated identity management so that GOLD authenticated users can access 
resources across organizational boundaries. 
c) A common format and structure for making security assertions 
d) A transfer protocol for passing assertions between GOLD and its participants 
across the wire. 
5.1.2 Authorization 
In [18] we discussed the advantages and disadvantages or access control models 
ranging from active control lists to role and task based systems. We concluded that 
the dynamic nature of our system makes it necessary for GOLD to implement a 
dynamic mechanism capable of distinguishing between projects, tasks in each project 
and roles in each task. Additionally, we also want to move forward from the strict and 
rigid notion of rights assignment to rights allocation and de-allocation based on 
progress and other project related factors. In a virtual organisation the execution 
context can be regarded as a particular VO project. In a virtual organisation there can 
be many projects with various participants resulting in complicated interrelationships 
between them. For example, some of them may play the same role in various projects, 
carrying out the exact same tasks, or have different roles within the same project 
depending on the performed task. The question we raise is ‘Should a role have the 
same permission and access rights throughout the set of similar or even identical 
projects and the tasks within those projects?’ Our view is that in dynamic access 
control systems we should separate roles from role instances. Different role instances 
may require different permissions and indeed additional for examples, levels of 
authorisation depending on the project and task in which they are active. The domain 
of chemical development requires the sharing of sensitive information between 
participants who may have conflicting interests. In order to raise the levels of trust 
within such a VO, we need to make sure that we have developed fine grained access 
control mechanisms.  
 
The main issues regarding access control relate to the degree of granularity embedded 
in the controlling mechanism itself. By granularity we refer to the level of detail for 
which we are prepared to define access rights. We need fine grained permissions for 
instances of roles as well as instances of objects. For example, a chemist role may be 
granted access to chemical documents but we do not however wish to grant access to 
all chemical documents produced by the system. Instead, we want any access 
permissions granted to the chemist role to be project-specific (e.g., the instance of a 
particular collaboration) as well as task-specific (e.g., the instance of a particular pre-
defined set of activities). So the management of roles and access permissions in 
GOLD needs to be integrated with the management and monitoring of dynamic 
service level agreements or contracts between the participating services. The contracts 
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can capture the expectations from specific tasks, using pre- and post-conditions. 
Permissions for roles can be activated and de-activated based on the progress of the 
monitored contracts. 
 
Since part of our GOLD trust architecture requires us to de-centralise control of the 
resources (in terms of governing policies see 5.1.1) there are several functionalities 
which the architecture has to support including,  
 
a) a common language for expressing authorisation policies that is understood by 
all participants  
b) a protocol for expressing policies and rules that is understood by all 
participants  
c) a protocol for transferring/communicating these policies across the wire 
d) a centralised policy repository 
e) a verification component prior to the execution of the workflow. 
 
5.2 Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation is a way of addressing the issue of auditing. The purpose of auditing 
is to maintain a trail of activity within the VO and to provide irrefutable evidence of 
the actions a participant has performed. There are two main architectural concerns: 
the nature of the data, and storage and maintenance. Non-repudiation as an audit 
mechanism, as well as properties such as data integrity and confidentiality are 
commonly implemented using public key cryptography. As such we examine public 
key cryptography briefly in the next paragraph. 
5.2.1 Data Encryption 
Data encryption is a mechanism that is essential in achieving integrity, confidentiality 
and non-repudiation. Encryption implies the encoding of data using a key (long string 
of bytes). This results in a cipher. Decryption consequently is achieved by applying a 
key to the encoded message in order to decipher it. The process is achieved by either 
having a single key used for both encryption and decryption, or a public and a private 
key, also known as pubic key infrastructure. PKI is more secure and reliable since 
keys do not have to travel between parties to cipher and de-cipher messages. 
Typically assuming a party wants to send a message to the private key owner, he 
would use the public key of that owner to cipher his message. The private key owner 
would use his private key to de-cipher the message upon delivery.  As we mentioned 
earlier PKI is used to achieve 3 aspects of security (integrity, confidentiality and non-
repudiation). Each aspect relies on the way these keys are used. 
 
The architectural burden this adds is that companies should be issued with key pairs 
by an authority such as GOLD (unless they carry their own) which will also be 
responsible for maintaining these keys in registries. The assumption being, that 
individual participants may not own their own keys, when they enter the VO. It 
provides GOLD with greater flexibility to assume that participants will be issued with 
such keys when they enter the VO, than to expect them to have there own keys prior 
to participating in a VO project. 
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5.2.2 Architectural Components for Auditing 
Auditing is the process of maintaining a trail of actions between the various 
participants in the VO. It is particularly important in our case since we are dealing 
with components outside a single entity of control. The purpose of the audit and 
maintaining a trail of actions, is to ensure a VO wide agreement about the activities 
performed by all VO members and at the same time provide irrefutable evidence that 
those actions were committed. 
 
 
Figure 1. Architectural components for audit 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the architectural components for maintaining audit trails. As 
part of the general trust requirement to allow individual participants to maintain as 
much control as possible over their resources, we also allow audit repositories to be 
maintained behind each organizational boundary. Bearing in mind our discussions on 
access control requirements (see 6.1.2) as well as the need for privacy which may 
manifest itself as partial anonymity (real company identities only known to GOLD), 
we need to maintain trails of the logical view of activities, with the possibility of 
composing or synthesizing the physical/actual trail of activities (i.e. that of 
transactions between company identities). To do this we need to establish one type of 
audit repository for participants and a separate type of GOLD. Since access control 
requirements call for GOLD to mediate transactions between the participants by 
intercepting message exchanges, audit trails can be kept at the GOLD side regarding 
the entire VO project. An abstract view of the data requirements is described below. 
 
 
 
 13
 VO_ID 
 Project ID 
 Task ID> 
 Participating Roles 
 Actions Committed 
VO_ID 
 Project ID 
 Task ID> 
 Actions Committed 
 Action Details Table 1.  Gold Audit Trail 
Table 2. Participant Audit Trail 
 
 
Both sides need to maintain audit data. In the case of the participant, the trail 
describes the VO and the project (which are standard for a particular instance of the 
VO and project) and importantly the task in which the role participates, and the 
actions that have been successfully executed along with details regarding time, pre-
post conditions etc. GOLD needs to maintain a trail of the VO, the project and the 
task an action was committed, the participants of the task (roles and the map between 
real identities and roles), the actions committed as part of the task as well as the action 
details. Agreement (i.e. successful matching) between the data held by the participant 
and the data held by GOLD would provide a complete trail while at the same time the 
need for privacy and anonymity is maintained. 
5.3 Integrity, Confidentiality, Privacy 
Several of the failures that GOLD could provide guarantees against are those relating 
to the transfer of documents (particularly those of sensitive content) to various 
participants. Two major aspects are confidentiality (i.e. the data is not visible to 
anyone) and integrity (the data has not been tampered with during the transfer). 
Providing such guarantees would require GOLD to implement certain security 
protocols for the handling of messages between the various participants. Both 
integrity and confidentiality can be guaranteed by implementing public key 
encryption mechanisms. Some of the architectural components for achieving this are 
given below. 
5.3.1 Guarantees 
The first major consideration in providing guarantees is the role of GOLD in the 
actual transactions. In order to guarantee the integrity or confidentiality of the 
messages exchanged GOLD needs to play an active role in monitoring such message 
exchanges. One proposed solution is to allow a GOLD service to participate as an 
online third party between every multi-party interaction that takes place within the 
V.O. project. This implies that GOLD could intercept all communication channels 
between 2 entities that are part of the V.O. The proposed solution not only allows for 
guarantees to be given but also for carrying out auditing. As we mentioned in 5.1.5 
the process for identifying the potential guarantees that can be given, requires first the 
establishment of a set of fault assumptions. Obviously, as one cannot guarantee 
against everything, assumptions can limit the number of possible failures.  
5.3.2 Assumptions 
Since we talked about guarantees we need to talk about fault assumptions. Some of 
the assumptions are described below. 
a)We assume that the recipients of keys will trust the authority that distributed that 
key. This is in effect an assumption related to the distribution of public keys. 
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b) We also assume that the recipient of a message trusts that the private key of the 
sender has not been compromised in any manner. This again is a valid assumption as 
the maintenance of private keys is outside the scope of GOLD. We assume that 
private keys are secure. 
c) We assume that the cryptographic algorithms we use to cipher messages will not be 
compromised.  
  
 
5.3.3 Confidentiality guarantee protocol 
Confidentiality is achieved using encryption. In GOLD we guarantee message 
confidentiality using public key cryptography which implies the existence of 2 
mathematically symmetric keys to cipher and de-cipher messages. Let us examine the 
following protocol. Assume that company A wants to deliver a message to company 
B as part of a GOLD V.O. Additionally we assume that the companies require 
guarantees from GOLD that the message will be delivery in confidence, masking 
company IDs and prohibiting anyone else from viewing the message. The following 
protocol would apply as illustrated in the following figures 2 and 3. The shaded boxes 
indicate architectural components. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The solid lines demonstrate the GOLD  
confidentiality guarantee protocol, outlined in 6 stages. 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the architectural components and their interactions via GOLD 
and its participants. GOLD mediates all communication between the various 
companies. The following table explains the protocol.  
 
1. Company A retrieves GOLD public key and ciphers the message. 
2. Company sends the messages to GOLD 
3. Gold de-ciphers the message using its own private key 
4. GOLD uses B’s public key to cipher the message for the second time 
5. GOLD sends the message to B 
6. B de-ciphers the message using its public key. 
Table 3. Protocol for integrity guarantee 
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 5.3.4 Integrity guarantee protocol 
Maintaining the integrity of a document or message implies that the data (during the 
transfer from a sender to a receiver) has remained intact. This is an additional concern 
in environments where sensitive information -upon which business level decisions are 
based- are transferred between entities. This is of course the case in GOLD as 
documents within a V.O. are moved between companies. GOLD could provide 
integrity guarantees by intercepting the document transfer to check its integrity. 
Assuming that the document’s integrity has not been compromised GOLD can 
forward it to its recipient using its own key to cipher the document. Having 
established the documents integrity credentials, GOLD can make a positive assertion 
regarding the document to the recipient. This of course adds to the weight of the 
protocol (additional ciphers are needed) but on the other hand it allows for GOLD to 
guarantee that property. In the following figure a message is sent from company A to 
company B within the domain of a GOLD VO. The numbers next to the descriptions 
indicate sequence of events. In the first instance A ciphers the message using its 
private key. Both the message and digest are sent to GOLD. GOLD checks the 
integrity of the message and then ciphers the message using its own private key. At 
this stage GOLD can guarantee that the message’s integrity has not been 
compromised. At the same time the identity of the A does not have to be revealed. 
Company B receives the message from GOLD which de-ciphers using GOLD public 
key. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Integrity guarantee procedure 
 
The protocol is obviously “heavier” both in terms of messages being passed and 
components that need to implemented to execute it. On the other hand it provides both 
guarantees that the data is intact as well as a sound audit trail, that can be maintained 
by GOLD. 
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1. Sender produces hash of document 
2. Sender signs hash using private key 
3. User ciphers document using private key 
4. Sender sends signed hash 
5. Sender sends signed document 
6. GOLD received both hash and document and uses Sender’s public key to re-cipher 
them. 
7. GOLD uses original data to create hash and compares the 2 hash outputs.  
8. Depending of the physical location of the document, GOLD uses its private key to 
cipher the original document and its hash and sends them to company B. 
9. Company uses original data to create hash and compares the 2 hash outputs.  
10. If hash comparison proves correct then company B uses the document. 
 
Table 4. Integrity guarantee protocol 
5.3.5 Anonymity guarantee protocol 
Participants in GOLD have the right to remain anonymous. Although the common 
mechanisms for achieving this are in fact legal rather than technological, we would 
like in the following paragraphs to highlight the need (and consequent requirement) 
for hiding the identity of some of the hidden participants. There are various reasons 
for this, most of them relating to general issues of maintaining competitive advantage. 
Some of these reasons and further explanations have been highlighted already3. 
 
 
GOLD
Private
B
Private
A
Private
Cipher 
GOLD Public
Key
Public Keys 
Directory
Obtain
Key 3.0 5.0 Cipher
Cipher message
Using Private Key 4.0
Cipher message
Using Private Key 1.0
 
Figure 4. Signed (anonymous) Message from A to B via GOLD 
 
The above figure illustrates the protocol, some of the architectural components, and 
more importantly the role of GOLD as an online third party mediating all 
communication between parties that require private communication. Audit trails are 
still possible since identities are only revealed to GOLD. Audit trails can be 
maintained at the participant’s side by interested parties. The following table 
describes the protocol in simple text. 
 
                                                 
3 See GOLD proposal 
 17
1. Company A ciphers the message using its private key. 
2. Company sends the cipher to GOLD 
3. Gold de-ciphers the message using Company A’s public key. This guarantees that 
the message was send by Company A 
 
4. GOLD uses its own private key to cipher the message for the second time 
5. GOLD sends the message to B 
6. Company B de-ciphers the message using GOLD’s public key. The message is 
guaranteed to be a VO related message from A to B while A remains anonymous. 
 
*Note: Comparison between public keys can reveal ones identity. We want to avoid 
this between intercepting the message send from a to be. 
 
Table 5. Anonymity guarantee protocol 
 
5.3.6 Feedback  
Feedback is the process by which collaboration details about VO projects can be 
evaluated and consequently made available to other candidate participants in further 
VO projects. Feedback as a mechanism can assist in raising the degree of trust a party 
is willing to place in another by knowing how that party has performed in previous 
collaborations. Recent findings in the area of feedback based trust [25], has shown 
that feedback coming from the participants of a system only serves its purpose if the 
feedback sample is considerably large. In simple terms, the decision whether someone 
is trustworthy is based on statistical analysis of the feedback data. In order to make an 
informed decision the statistical sample has to be large (i.e. to demonstrate depth 
which implies many opinions about each participant from a variety of sources). This 
is only the case however when the feedback data is coming from participants. 
Centralized feedback data on the other hand can serve the same purpose with smaller 
samples. Since the process of acquiring large samples of feedback data from 
participants is both time and cost consuming, GOLD maintains central feedback data 
regarding collaborations between the different companies or their disguises as roles. 
GOLD can indeed advise along with its capabilities service whether a participant has 
any prior collaboration history with any of the candidate participants. As we said 
earlier the process of making an informed decision is largely based on the depth of the 
sample (you can’t make an accurate prediction about a party unless one has engaged 
in collaboration a few times). Since GOLD lacks that depth of sample in its early 
stages of operation, it would be unwise to make any judgment regarding a 
participant’s quality. Therefore candidate participants will be informed about previous 
collaborations with specific roles and other participants as part of the GOLD 
capability4 service. Decisions regarding actual collaboration are left to the 
participants. 
6 Conclusions 
The report demonstrated the usage of soft systems modeling to address the non 
functional property of trust. We tackled the problem of establishing collaborations 
between autonomous parties in dynamic environments where trust as well as 
instruments for evaluating trust are limited. Virtual organizations require rapid, on-
                                                 
4 See main GOLD architecture document 
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demand integration. Our conclusions lead us to believe that the potential of forming 
trust relationships can be supported by addressing issues such as control, auditing, 
maintenance of historical data, and finally providing guarantees against certain types 
of failure. We evaluated those against further analysis using conversation theory 
models, and addressed their architectural components. 
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 8 Appendix SSM Trust models for report 
 
Rich picture 
 
 
 
 
Relevant systems 
 
To allow VO participants to be in control of business processes. 
To maintain a history of transactions for participants in a virtual project. 
To address transactional failures for each participant 
To provide guarantees to VO participants against failure. 
 
 
8.1 Allow VO participants to be in control of their business 
processes  
 
GOLD (REQUIREMENTS) SYSTEM DEFINITION ID:0 
 
ROOT DEFINITION 
 
To allow companies to be in control of their business processes (when working 
collaboratively in a virtual environment) by providing appropriate mechanisms in 
order to work effectively as part of a VO 
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CATWOE DECLARATION 
Customers 
Advantaged Companies. 
 
Disadvantaged  
 
Other stakeholders  
 
 
Actors Companies. 
(GOLD software). 
 
Transformation The need for 
companies to be in 
control of their 
business processes 
 
 
⇒ T ⇒ That need met 
 
Weltanschauung Companies will only work as part of a VO is they feel that they are 
in control of what they do. 
 
Owners Companies. 
 
 
Environmental & 
Other constraints 
Constraints imposed by environment 
upon any manifestation of the system 
Constraints accepted or 
assumptions made in our 
modelling of the system 
 Money, time, the ability of the 
GOLD software to allow 
companies to be in control of 
their business processes. 
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ACTIVITY MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Es 
Efficacy Is company in control of business processes? 
 
Efficiency Are minimum resources used? 
 
Effectiveness  
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COMMENTS 
 
ACTIVITY COMMENTS INFORMATION 
PRODUCTS 
CREATED/USED 
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.   
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8.2 Appreciate failure modes of individual VO participants 
GOLD (REQUIREMENTS) SYSTEM DEFINITION ID:0 
 
ROOT DEFINITION 
 
To appreciate failure modes of individual VO participants by allowing them to 
express failure in terms of states in order to work effectively as part of a VO. 
Note: a state is a snapshot of particular data values at a particular time. 
 
 
 
 
CATWOE DECLARATION 
Customers 
Advantaged Companies. 
 
Disadvantaged  
 
Other stakeholders  
 
 
Actors Companies. 
(GOLD software). 
 
Transformation The need to 
appreciate failure 
modes for 
individual 
participants 
 
 
⇒ T ⇒ Failure modes for individual participants formally 
understood (appreciated) 
 
Weltanschauung Trust will emerge as a property if this (and other criteria) is met. 
 
 
Owners Companies. 
 
 
Environmental & 
Other constraints 
Constraints imposed by environment 
upon any manifestation of the system 
Constraints accepted or 
assumptions made in our 
modelling of the system 
 Semantics of being able to 
express protocols in a mutually 
understood manner. 
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ACTIVITY MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Es 
Efficacy Are failure modes appreciated? 
 
Efficiency Are minimum resources used? 
 
Effectiveness Is the GOLD system trusted? 
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COMMENTS 
 
ACTIVITY COMMENTS INFORMATION 
PRODUCTS 
CREATED/USED 
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
6.   
7.   
8.   
9.   
10.   
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9 Appendix 2. Conversation Theory 
The following paragraph demonstrate a brief analysis of the relationships that can be 
established within GOLD between GOLD itself and its participants. The purpose of 
this is to identify the conversational characteristics of each relationship type and 
hence identify the potential degree of trust between the VO parties. 
9.1 Definition of concepts 
 
A conversation, in the sense in which we are using the term here, is an exchange, or 
series of exchanges, between two parties. It may take place over an extended period of 
time and be transmitted over a number of different media. The nature of a 
conversation between two parties depends on the nature of the relationship between 
them. The importance of conversations is that they establish the responsibilities and 
obligations that serve to define the relationship between the parties. Because a 
conversation is potentially very long lived, there is a need to keep the partial results 
(i.e. the current state) of a conversation. Such partial results are information. There are 
two kinds of information that are relevant to broking: knowledge that has (or 
alternatively has not yet) been exchanged; and commitments made. Logically, these 
must be kept separately in an information store and a commitment store, since they 
have quite different requirements for security, privacy and visibility. 
 
What this means is that the architecture must provide direct support for conversations. 
It must be possible to link separate exchanges together as part of a larger 
conversation. Furthermore, conversations may refer to other conversations, and 
responsibilities (commitments) may be delegated. This means that the requirements 
are basically those of a workflow management system, but the need to keep a record 
of the communications exchanged and commitments made is explicit. 
Conversations are characterised in terms of the following attributes: 
Significance: the importance to each of the parties of what it has to lose or to gain. In 
general, significance may be symmetrical or asymmetrical but, in a market 
conversation, there is an expectation of some sort of parity with both sides benefitting 
if a deal is struck.  
Mutuality: in the normative definition of the relationship, this is the level of 
responsibility that each participant takes for the benefit and protection of the interests 
of the other. Again, in the general case, mutuality can be high or low and it may or 
may not be symmetrical. Zero mutuality is associated with the 'caveat emptor' 
principle of the consumer-supplier relationship. Market regulation usually legislates 
for non-zero mutuality between the seller and the purchaser — for example, physical 
goods must be of merchantable quality. Similarly, a market implies negative 
mutuality, i.e. competition, between suppliers. 
Provision:  this represents the set of resources and capabilities which are necessary in 
order to fulfil the role. 
Control: this represents the allocation of access to and control of the medium and 
channels of communications required to execute the conversation. 
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9.2 Conversation Types 
The general view of GOLD is that the VO is characterised by total lack of trust 
between its participants. There are 3 basic relationships within GOLd as shown by the 
following diagram. 
 
 
Figure 5. Trust relationships in GOLD 
 
At the figure suggests there are 3 main relationships those between companies that 
have experience of working with each other prior to GOLD, those between companies 
that may not entirely trust each other due to lack of experience and historical data. In 
these types of relationships although risk in uncertain, the motivation is usually added 
value which in effect creates both a common context which we have identify as a 
potential element for trust growth. Also both of the above relationships have the 
potential of becoming transitive since trust in one domain may result in trust in a 
similar domain. The 3rd relationship is that between a participant and GOLD. Here 
what hinders participation is the uncertainty related to the lack of experience and 
historical data about the operation and collaboration between the participant and 
GOLD. Added value, time reduction and lower costs can provide a motive. The 
relationship between GOLD roles and companies is transitive. This is the outcome of 
the anonymity behind the notion of Role.  
9.3 Conversation Values 
The purpose of this paragraph is to provide some rough values to the relationships we 
have identified in order to identify a rough estimate between conversation values and 
trust. 
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Company A
GOLD
Company B
UnTrusted Relationship
Forced by Contracts
Trusted Relationship 
Based on Experience
Company A
Company A
GOLD 
Assigned 
ROLE
UnTrusted Relationship 
Lack of previous experience, and 
information
Asymmetric in terms of Significance 
and Mutuality. Significance is 
established by context, however there 
are no guarantees between the roles
Potentially symmetric in both 
significance and mutuality
Symmetric and Mutual depending on 
the responsibilities held by GOLD. 
Failure guarantees can help alleviate 
part of the problem
 
Figure 6. Significance and Mutuality 
 
Within GOLD we have 2 types of relationships; those between GOLD and its 
participants and those between GOLD roles (executed by companies) and companies. 
Both are potentially asymmetric which implies that there are no certain measures of 
how benefits are distributed and there are no responsibilities held for the benefits of 
each other. Since GOLD is masking company identities then the asymmetry between 
a company and the role that is liaising within GOLD remains. GOLD itself as a 
system needs to alleviate this problem by providing some guarantees regarding its 
responsibilities. These may take the form of failure guarantees, maintaining audit 
trails, allowing individual companies to express their security policies regarding the 
usage of their resources etc. 
9.4 Conclusions 
The following diagram concludes the analysis. 
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Figure 7. Conversation Types 
 
The diagram draws upon the previous diagrams to provide an overall view of the 
types of conversation and the relation these have to trust. 
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